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Abstract 
 
 The advent of cryptocurrencies is the latest evolution in the marriage of monetary systems 
and technology, at its heart being digital assets; the oldest and most well-known of these is bitcoin. 
The subject of cryptocurrencies has proved extremely divisive, from those who believe they will 
ultimately replace national currencies to those who see them as a digital incarnation of an 
anachronistic system like the gold standard. These divisive opinions have manifested themselves 
through government regulatory approaches as well, with some governments seeking outright bans on 
cryptocurrencies within their borders. Some generally smaller states however, are pursuing 
establishment of flexible and progressive regulatory frameworks, seeking to become financial 
technology hubs for cryptocurrency development and trade. This thesis explores why these 
progressive regulatory responses to cryptocurrencies are being pursued by certain European ‘crypto-
friendly’ states, and use both a case study and international relations theory - namely small state 
theory as developed by Peter Katzenstein in his seminal work ‘Small States in World Markets’ (1985) 
- in an attempt to understand why these differences exist. 
 
Introduction 
 
With even just a peripheral awareness of the mainstream news in 2017, one can have hardly 
failed to notice that the subject of bitcoin has been increasingly-present amongst the headlines. The 
year bore witness to a meteoric rise in value of the digital currency, as it began transitioning from 
being the concern of a distinct subset of computer science and programming experts, into the 
mainstream. To describe the rise of the digital asset as meteoric is not to overstate it; between January 
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1st, 2017 and January 1st, 2018, the US dollar value of one bitcoin rose from $985 to $15,527, a rise of 
more than 1,300%1.  
 Bitcoin is just one of a huge raft of digital currencies traded on the internet and is not alone in 
having made extraordinary gains in value in an extremely short time period; ethereum, the digital 
asset often dubbed ‘silver’ to bitcoin’s ‘gold’, saw gains of more than 9,000% in 2017. Litecoin, a 
derivative of the same algorithm behind bitcoin, rose by over 5,000%, whilst other, more obscure ‘alt-
coins’ such as ripple and NEM had gains in value of 36,018% and 29,842% in 2017 respectively2. To 
put this in perspective, $100, invested in ripple in January 2017 would have yielded a real return of 
over $35,000 in January 2018. These are no small sums; the total market capitalisation for the 
cryptocurrencies in the last quarter of 2017 (and in December 2017, there were more than 1,300 
registered for trade on CoinMarketCap.com) was over six-hundred billion dollars (Coindesk 2018). 
 Cryptocurrency’s explosion has been in large part propelled by a boom in initial coin 
offerings (ICOs), in essence a novel way of crowdfunding for project development by innovative tech 
start-ups. Similar in many ways to an initial public offering (IPO) on the stock market, ICOs can 
attract vast amounts of capital to projects in a short amount of time by selling their own 
cryptocurrencies to speculative investors. The rapid rise in value and awareness of cryptocurrency and 
ICOs through 2017 has left something of a regulatory void in most legal systems because it represents 
an entirely new category of asset, and ICOs a new category fundraising. Their nature means they do 
not simply fit into existing legal frameworks because of, for example, issues of ownership and 
jurisdiction; jurisdiction of digital objects is notoriously difficult to argue in legal terms and just as 
with many other digital products, one cannot touch a bitcoin, nor trace its location to a specific place. 
In many cases, this legal ambiguity is being addressed by the extension of existing laws pertaining to 
tax and prevention of criminal activity, to cover cryptocurrency as well. In the United States, this has 
meant the extension of know your customer (KYC) laws to now cover bitcoin transactions as well 
(Conley 2017). Similarly, in the European Union, this can be seen in the extension of the ‘Anti-
                                                          
1 For a full table of figures, see Figure 1, appendix. 
2 See Figure 2, appendix. 
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Money Laundering’ directive (AMLd) of which a 2016 amendment is to be implemented in 2018, 
which requires the identities of owners of cryptocurrency exchange accounts in Europe to be present 
and accessible to authorities should it be required (European Commission 2016).  
But not all government responses are equal in their approach to cryptocurrency; the appetite 
for regulation varies hugely globally. China, whose domestic exchanges previously accounted for as 
much as 90% of bitcoin’s trade volume globally, has sought an ever-tougher stance on 
cryptocurrencies through rigorous regulation, taking steps throughout 2017 designed to make trading 
and mining in China more difficult (Weese 2017). South Korea and Russia have both also sought to 
increase government control over cryptocurrency usage. Meanwhile some countries have moved in 
the opposite direction: Japan, in a landmark move in April 2017, passed laws recognising bitcoin as a 
legal form of payment within the country. It has also introduced blockchain-based protocols3 into 
many government systems (Nikkei inc 2017) . Singapore, similarly has experimented with virtual 
currency technologies; the Monetary Authority of Singapore announced in 2017 that it had been 
trialling a tokenised version of the Singapore dollar on a private blockchain with positive results4. 
Venezuela meanwhile launched its own cryptocurrency, Petro in 2018. 
Within Europe too, there have been greatly varying responses from governments. Despite the 
aforementioned amendment to the AMLd, there still exists virtually no EU level regulation which 
refers to cryptocurrency and, at the time of writing, there exists no regulation which specifically 
targets cryptocurrencies within the EU. In its absence, member states have taken it upon themselves to 
pursue their own measures over the new policy area. Germany has called for global regulation of the 
digital currency space following the publication of Chinese plans to enforce limitations on the trading 
of digital currencies (Gaunt 2018). France has commissioned a working group headed by Jean-Pierre 
Landau, the former deputy-governor of the Bank of France, tasked with development of national 
cryptocurrency regulations in order to minimise risks caused by speculation (Sundararajan 2018). The 
UK and Estonia have both announced research plans into launching their own domestic digital 
                                                          
3 Blockchain, the technology upon which the bitcoin network runs, is further discussed in section 2.1. 
4 For the full report, see (Monetary Authoruty of Singapore et al. 2017). 
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currencies, pegged to sterling and the euro respectively (Thorpe 2018; Teffer 2017). Switzerland 
meanwhile, has actively pursued business-friendly regulation to attract financial technology firms to 
its territory, creating ‘regulatory sandboxes’ for digital currency start-ups, in which young enterprises 
can test new technologies with the freedom of a low-regulatory environment (The Federal Council of 
Switzerland 2016). The Swiss city of Zug is widely known by the epithet, ‘Crypto-Valley’, due to the 
high number of financial technology firms located there. 
But the question arises of how the variation in government responses to cryptocurrency can 
be understood; why is this phenomenon drawing such mixed reactions from states? There are 
doubtless many potential reasons for why governments may take different stances regarding 
cryptocurrencies. The market’s notorious volatility, which has seen price swings of over 30% in 24-
hour periods on multiple occasions has drawn strong criticism from many in both the public and 
private sector. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase infamously referred to bitcoin as ‘a fraud’ and 
‘worse than tulip bulbs’ (Son, Levitt and Louis 2017) and Charlie Munger, vice-chairman of 
Berkshire Hathaway described bitcoin as a ‘noxious poison’ which governments need to ‘step on … 
hard’ (La Roche 2018). Other critics cite the technology’s lack of tangibility and unpredictability as 
reasons for scepticism. Conversely, others wish to create attractive legal environments in order to 
draw in investor capital and which can foster technological development and growth, so that the 
technology may become more stable and diversify use cases.  
Nevertheless, through the stark variation in approaches from European states, a potential 
trend seems to emerge in that it is generally a number of Europe’s smaller states which seem to be 
taking the lead in creating ‘crypto-friendly’ regulatory environments. Larger states such as the UK, 
France and Germany have not issued any notable regulation which directly concerns cryptocurrencies; 
this is not to say that they have therefore been regulated against, but rather there has been no active 
regulating at all. Active construction of a regulatory environment has rather come from countries, 
often peripheral to larger economic centres. These include, Estonia, Belarus, Slovenia, Gibraltar, 
Malta and Switzerland. All of these nations have shown evidence that they are pursuing creating a 
regulatory environment which makes doing business with cryptocurrencies easier. The concept of the 
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small state is a notion which has a wealth of literature behind it in the field of international relations. 
Among other things, small states have been identified to behave in different ways to larger ones; 
historically, they have had to explore creative areas for investment which get around the handicaps of 
having a small workforce or low natural resource endowment (Vital 1967). Larger states often need to 
satisfy a greater variety of interest groups within a larger bureaucracy, making adoption of new laws 
cumbersome.  
In light of these varying levels of regulation, in correlation with the apparent smallness of 
states, the question of why these states pursue more stringent regulations than larger ones is clearly a 
relevant enquiry. The reasons for this may be numerous and this paper certainly cannot go into all of 
them. It will however examine existing regulatory stances by using a case study and looking through 
the lens of small state theory in attempt to discover if they are able to offer an explanation as to why 
these variations exist. With this in mind, this paper will attempt to answer the research question: 
‘Why are small European states more likely to perceive cryptocurrencies as an opportunity 
for economic growth than larger ones?’ 
 
1.0 – Methodology 
 
 The remainder of this paper will unfold over several steps. Firstly, there will be an expansion 
on the topic of cryptocurrency, where some context will be provided and relevant aspects of 
cryptocurrencies and ICOs discussed, with analysis of the opportunities and challenges facing 
regulators within this new field. Secondly, the list of ‘crypto-friendly’ states will be examined in more 
detail through exploration of what exactly makes them ‘crypto-friendly’ in terms of policy goals 
which they are pursuing. 
Thirdly, small state theory will be assessed. This theory as presented in Peter Katzenstein’s, 
Small States in World Markets (1985) has formed much of the basis of this research. Katzenstein’s 
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work has been chosen because of its significance within the broad field of international relations5 and 
also because it lends itself for comparison: as Katzenstein discussed small European states and their 
relationships in world markets, this paper shall investigate how far his findings hold true for small 
European states in cryptocurrency markets. Fourthly, a case study on Estonia will be conducted in 
order to test how far the country’s cryptocurrency stance can be explained by characteristics attributed 
by small state theory. Finally, concluding remarks will be made. 
 
2.0 – Cryptocurrencies and ICOs: Opportunities and Challenges  
 
 This section will provide an outline of the subject matter, namely cryptocurrencies and ICOs, 
and the regulatory challenges they present. For states of all sizes, there are a number of challenges 
which are held in common when attempting to legislate for this novel field. Through this section, it 
should become clear what a positive stance toward cryptocurrencies and ICOs entails, as the hurdles 
which must be overcome are identified. Regulators have faced numerous challenges vis-à-vis 
regulating cryptocurrencies from issues of jurisdiction to taxation. Through these factors, it is clear 
that cryptocurrencies present a great challenge to regulators because of their novelty. In some sense 
this is obvious: they are the first asset in history which is entirely digital, which sets them in a 
completely new paradigm to which new rules apply. This requires new frameworks to be constructed 
and any effective regulatory framework must target three broad areas: 
1. The technology on which cryptocurrencies run 
2. The unique nature of cryptocurrencies themselves 
3. The practice of ICOs 
                                                          
5 Mark Blyth (2012) cites it as one of the three foundational texts within the field of political economy, along 
with, Peter Gourevitch’s Politics in Hard Times (1986) and Peter Hall’s Governing the Economy (1986). 
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Each of these areas will be explored and challenges for each area will be highlighted. In order 
to better inform one’s understanding of the analysis, it is worth acknowledging the great deal of 
variation and inconsistency with terminology in this emerging field of research6. Cryptocurrency is 
often described in terms which mirror established monetary and exchange systems which exist today; 
one hears these novel digital assets described using everyday vocabulary like, ‘coin’, ‘currency’ and, 
‘wallet’. Linguistic choice and variation in explanation and publications reflects a variety of 
contributing factors, from the discipline in which the author has been trained, their personal biases, to 
the purpose of the text being produced. Walch (2017) highlights a number of motivating factors 
behind language choice in the cryptocurrency space, including the desire to attract capital to projects, 
as well as word taint7. Despite the fact that cross-mixing of semantic fields is largely unavoidable 
with any new technology (and by no means problematic in itself), every effort for specificity and 
consistency must be made, so as much clarity as possible is maintained in this extremely young area 
of research. With this in mind, this section will aim to provide clarity of definition of key terms as 
well as analysis. 
 
2.1 – The Technology on which Cryptocurrencies Run 
 
Blockchain is the technology behind cryptocurrencies; the network on which they run, which 
first found application as the platform on which bitcoin was launched. It is, at its heart, a record of all 
transactions which have ever taken place on its network (Nakamoto 2008). Filippi and Wright 
describe it as ‘a chronological database of transactions recorded by a network of computers.’ (Wright 
and Filippi 2015). What makes it so compelling, is that this database is highly tamper-resistant; 
indeed, provable accuracy forms the basis of the technology’s significance and appeal (Werbach 
                                                          
6 See Angela Walch’s, ‘The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law)’ (2017) for a full exploration of this 
subject. 
7 Word taint refers to the pejoration of certain terms; the term cryptocurrency itself, is highlighted as one which 
has become associated with speculation and hype around bitcoin. ‘Virtual currency’ on the other hand is a more 
favoured label used by those wishing to sound more ‘restrained and controlled’ (Walch 2017). 
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2018). Whilst blockchain was created specifically as a platform for bitcoin to run on when it was 
launched in 2009, the technology has since been replicated innumerable times and today it serves as 
an integral part of, not only cryptocurrency networks, but also many other types of databases and 
record-keeping tools both in the private and public sector8. 
 The term, ‘blockchain’ – also widely referred to as ‘distributed ledger technology’ (DLT) – 
was first mentioned in the ‘Bitcoin Whitepaper’ (Nakamoto 2008), and derives its name from the 
nature in which information is recorded on the ledger. Blocks of recorded data9 are linked together in 
a chain, with specific coding connecting each block to the previous one in the chain; this creates a 
smooth and observable sequence of connectivity where each block in the chain contains the signature 
of the previous one recorded in it. The significance of this is that it is extremely difficult to alter any 
information once it is recorded, as this would create a disparity in the chronology of the code 
sequencing. The recording of the data is overseen automatically by nodes, which communicate with 
one another to verify the blockchain so far, and miners who are incentivised to approve transactions in 
exchange for payment, thereby adding blocks to the blockchain. 
 The mechanics of the blockchain’s system allow for its use-value – and therefore that of 
cryptocurrencies – to be theorised, which as Salzman (2016) and Liljeqvist (2018) state, can be 
identified as pertaining to five areas, which current financial infrastructure does not provide. 
Provenance refers to the traceability of transactions; on the blockchain, this is entirely decentralised 
and trustless. This holds huge implications for transparency and accountability in the monetary 
system. Consensus refers to the way information is secured within the network. The fact that there is 
no central authority which oversees the network, but rather it is secured through consensus between 
the network’s nodes, means there is no central party’s interests which are being considered; this is a 
                                                          
8 Walmart, Maersk and British Airways are among those transnational corporations which have implemented 
blockchain technology to provide solutions to operating inefficiencies (Morris 2017; Nash 2018). The US state 
of West Virginia announced in March 2018, that it would be using blockchain technology to allow absentee 
voters to participate in the senate primary elections in May 2018 (State of West Virginia 2018). 
9 In the case of the bitcoin blockchain, this data is bitcoin transactions, however applications can be myriad. 
British Airways for example apply it to prevent conflicting flight information appearing across their media; 
Walmart use it to track supply-chain data of fresh produce, in order to better be able to locate the origins of food 
which must be recalled (Nash 2018). 
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great increase in economic efficiency. The reliability of this consensus depends on network size; the 
larger the network, the more nodes in operation and therefore the greater the security of the network 
against malicious actors, who might seek to add alternative information to the blockchain. Security 
and immutability refers to the reliability of transaction history as well as the fact that information, 
once recorded, cannot be changed. This has huge implications for trust in transacting, removing the 
need for middlemen and third parties in many cases. It also ensures there is no danger of double-
spending of funds and reduces possibilities for fraudulent behaviour. Availability refers to the fact that 
due to the decentralised nature of cryptocurrency networks, there is no way to shut them down; they 
are always available. Whereas with traditional digital infrastructure, where a server failure, or network 
maintenance may result in a loss of service, cryptocurrency networks like the bitcoin network are 
administered and stored simultaneously by its users, meaning that network disruption is almost 
impossible, as it would require all network users to disengage from it. Finality refers to the 
irreversibility of transactions; once a transaction is recorded on the blockchain, it cannot be reversed. 
The value of this attribute lies in the fact that parties who do not know or trust each other can 
nevertheless transact together. Smart contracts enable a simultaneous execution of transaction and 
both parties can rest assured in the fact that the transaction cannot be reversed in any way (Sklaroff 
2017). 
These qualities are at once what make blockchain so potentially revolutionary as well as 
problematic when constructing a regulatory framework. Whilst the opportunities it creates are 
numerous as it can be used to increase operational efficiency in virtually all operations which require 
any form of record-keeping, it can at the same time present compliance problems with the law. This is 
exemplified by its potential conflict with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as data 
which is stored on the blockchain is immutable. GDPR regulation stipulates any person’s right to be 
forgotten must be respected by owners of databases. The inability to remove data from the blockchain 
as well as its decentralised nature (meaning that copies of the ledger and therefore the information it 
contains are in multiple locations across the network) present significant problems for regulators. 
Finck notes that this conflict serves to illustrate a clash of two normative objectives: protection of 
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fundamental rights and promotion of innovation which will sooner or later need to be resolved (Finck, 
Blockchains and Data 2017).  
 
2.2 – The Unique Nature of Cryptocurrencies  
 
Cryptocurrency refers to a broad range of coins and tokens which exist in the digital space; 
these are a new type of digitally-based asset class. Whilst bitcoin remains the most well-known, there 
are hundreds of others besides. Many are designed with specific use cases in mind and so the 
opportunities they present are manifold, potentially improving efficiency in many sectors of the 
economy. Cryptocurrencies can be argued as the logical extension of fiat for the digital age; the 
ultimate liberation from the opportunity costs of using material currencies to facilitate trade10. Whilst 
the capped total – and therefore deflationary quality11 – of many cryptocurrencies may draw some 
comparison with more anachronistic commodity-backed systems such as the gold standard, with 
respect to the diversion of other resources to create the currency, the comparison is superficial. 
Cryptocurrencies present a much more malleable concept than would be possible with any physical 
currencies or commodity; design with highly specific use-cases in mind create a host of opportunities 
for achieving distinct objectives. For example, Ripple (XRP) is used for reducing both transaction 
costs and latency for banks transacting globally (Schwartz, Youngs and Britto 2014). Stellar (XLM) is 
designed to address problems of interaction between closed economic systems, enabling simultaneous 
transactions with pairs of currencies at once; with Stellar, a sender may send money in dollars, which 
the recipient will receive almost instantaneously in, for example, euros or bitcoin (Maziers 2016). 
Cryptocurrency’s ability to transcend the geographical and physical limitations of transacting with 
                                                          
10 Adam Smith described this as the ‘waggon-way through the air’ (Smith 2000). 
11 With a pre-defined amount of, for example, bitcoin and based on the notion of an ever-expanding use-
network, the currency’s value will rise over time due to its increasing scarcity. This quality is a huge 
disincentive for holders to spend their bitcoin, as it may be worth more in future.   
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any other tangible commodity serves as the keystone for why comparison with previous systems of 
trade, such as the gold standard, do not hold up to full scrutiny. 
Meanwhile, regulators face challenges regarding how to categorise cryptocurrency within the 
law. Cryptocurrencies have been described as lying somewhere at the crossroads between money, 
investment instruments and commodities (Vardi 2016). However, using any of these labels on its own 
inevitably results in a description which does not capture the full scope of what cryptocurrencies are 
or can be used for. With regard to specificity of terminology, it is worth noting that even the term 
‘currency’ already becomes problematic, in that it leads one to draw overly general parallels between 
these new asset types and traditional fiat currencies. The primary function fiat currencies generally 
fulfil is the same worldwide: a medium of exchange between members of a society to make trade 
easier (Greaves Jr. 1973). Global variation in currencies – i.e. the reason multiple currencies exist 
throughout the world – is present because of numerous factors, including reasons of sovereignty, 
national jurisdiction and different economic realities between countries. Whilst these variations do not 
explicitly mean that currencies may not be used as monetary systems outside of the jurisdiction of the 
issuing authority (indeed, many countries throughout the world have official currencies which are not 
issued by their own central bank because they are seen as more stable than the domestic currency), it 
is not common because of its conflation with a devolution of sovereign power by the nation in 
question to an external sovereign authority; countries who do not issue their own currency have no 
choice but to accept the policies of the issuing party. Furthermore, they are left with a more limited set 
of tools with which to tackle economic problems and downturns, because they cannot use monetary 
policies such as quantitative easing at times when the economy may be struggling to restore 
competitiveness (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2015). Incidentally, this is precisely the problem that emerged 
during the Eurocrisis of 2012, which saw southern European countries like Greece struggling to 
recover competitiveness due to their inability to devalue their currency in relation to their debts 
(Haan, Hessel and Gillbert 2014). 
But the reason why the term ‘currency’ is arguably a misnomer for cryptocurrencies, is 
because there is no issuing authority. This is highly significant and challenges the notion of what 
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attributes are required for something to be a currency. Cryptocurrencies are theoretically 
decentralised, meaning that there is no central authority or bank which can enact any monetary policy 
over them. They run on a cryptographic protocol which controls how the currency can be created and 
/ or traded (Filippi 2014). Furthermore, the majority of cryptocurrencies have built-in caps on the 
amount which can ever be created, making them finite resources12. 
These properties of finiteness and decentralisation are used as pros and cons by 
cryptocurrency proponents and opponents in equal measure. Free-market fundamentalists use these 
attributes to promote cryptocurrencies as answers to the problems of self-interest and greed inherent 
in institutions of power in the financial system, which inevitably bring about recessions. Others, such 
as economist Paul de Grauwe, use these attributes to justify why bitcoin can never work as a currency 
because it has already been proven to fail; De Grauwe’s logic is that its properties – finiteness, 
deflationary nature – mean it can in essence be equated to the gold standard which ran – and failed – 
on the same principles (de Grauwe 2018).  
The challenges therefore lie in creating a new field of terminology for a new asset class; if it 
is not a currency, what is it? This in itself poses problems regarding the fact that there is, as yet, no 
real legal precedent set in this area; it is still too new. However, one can witness a definition slowly 
taking shape as prominent voices in finance declare what cryptocurrency is not. Speaking at the 
London School of Economics in 2016, the deputy governor of monetary policy at the Bank of 
England, Ben Broadbent said bitcoin cannot be a unit of account due to its high volatility and limited 
network reach (Broadbent 2016). Two years later, Mark Carney maintained the bank’s line and used 
his speech to the Scottish Economics Conference in 2018 to state that because of its inefficiency in 
being a store of value or efficient medium of exchange, bitcoin has ‘failed as a currency’ 13 (Carney 
2018). In June of 2018, William Hinman, Director of Corporate Finance at the United States 
                                                          
12 It is noted however that one may argue a supply cap in sense equals a kind of monetary policy. 
13 Incidentally, proponents of bitcoin and other cryptocurrency argue that cryptocurrencies are truer than most 
fiats; whereas governments can manipulate the value of their currencies through policy and regulatory action, 
cryptocurrency value is determined by pure supply and demand (Filippi 2014).  
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that they would not be classifying bitcoin or 
ethereum as a security due to their lack of central authority (Hinman 2018). 
Incidentally, Carney quoted economist Hyman Minsky in his speech, who said, ‘anyone can 
create money; the problem is to get it accepted’. Ironically bitcoin’s exponents assert that its 
endurance and continued usage since inception in 2008 show exactly this acceptance which is 
required (Barber, et al. 2012) Cryptocurrency’s ability to potentially solve significant problems within 
the current financial system, such as lengthy international transaction times and fees, as well as 
providing solutions for financial exclusion, makes their ascension to a degree inevitable and with 
increased usage will likely come greater price stability. 
As noted, cryptocurrencies exemplify an amalgamation of attributes not previously seen 
together in any type of financial asset (Vardi 2016); this unique and novel nature presents a number of 
challenges for regulators as it requires construction of a new regulatory paradigm into which they can 
fit functionally. As can be distilled from the literature, ‘crypto-friendly’ legislation, whilst still in its 
infancy everywhere can be seen to focus on three areas, which have been identified as, classification, 
enforcement and subsidiarity.  
 
2.2.1 – Classification 
 As noted, a challenge is presented by the fact that too much variation in classification of 
cryptocurrencies exists (Walch 2017; Wright and Filippi 2015); cryptocurrencies operate for the large 
part in legal grey areas throughout the world but frequently find themselves at the centres of legal 
classification rows14. The uncertainty created by grey areas in classification is not conducive to either 
development, perception or adoption of the technology; firms are inevitably reluctant to develop ideas 
without the certainty that they will not one day find themselves on the wrong side of the law and the 
                                                          
14 This for example is evident in the US, where, whilst the SEC has ruled that Ethereum is not a security, they 
are nevertheless in the process of deciding whether the Ethereum Foundation launched their 2014 ICO as a 
‘non-compliant security’ (Michaels and Vigna 2018). If this is found to be the case, the SEC may impose legal 
penalties on the Foundation for illegal sale of a security.  
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majority of the general public will continue to regard cryptocurrencies with suspicion as long as they 
only operate on the peripheries of society – a position to which they are relegated until these assets 
receive legal clarity from governments. As Walch (2017) states, the legal lexicon must be expanded 
and adapted in order to encompass cryptocurrencies into a legal framework as well. The legal lexicon 
surrounding cryptocurrencies requires tightening in order to create a more efficient legal framework. 
Inefficient or inaccurate lexical use in legal classification may lead to myriad subtle knock-on effects 
throughout regulatory systems and societies from money and time which is wasted courtroom battles 
over classification, to more general issues such as mass-adoption (or lack of) which is based on 
misunderstandings rather than the actual capabilities of the technology (Walch 2017). 
 
2.2.2 – Enforcement  
Regardless of what conclusions are reached insofar as legal classification is concerned, 
enforcement of the law surrounding cryptocurrency is a complex and multifaceted issue (Filippi 2014; 
Finck 2016). At current, most activity which is conducted using cryptocurrencies is carried out in such 
a way which makes it extremely difficult for authorities to police. Opportunities for obfuscation 
regarding the identities of those involved, currently exists at many points within the transaction 
process (Filippi 2014). Indeed, their decentralised nature forms the basis of the reason authorities will 
likely never be able to fully control them; there is no central body or data silo which can be targeted in 
order to control any aspect of their existence.  
Furthermore, it is without doubt that criminal activity around cryptocurrency must be 
addressed but proportionality must be borne in mind when assessing what this is. A common and 
often mischaracterised conception regarding cryptocurrencies is that they are predominantly 
associated with crime, including terrorism financing, money laundering, arms sales, drug dealing, sale 
of child pornography and human trafficking (Engle 2016). Bitcoin certainly carries connotations of 
shady activity centred around illicit goods transactions, carried out in isolated corners of the deep 
web, an image which has been cultivated by certain high profile criminal cases, including bitcoin’s 
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use as the financing instrument behind the illegal online marketplace Silk Road15. As Filippi (2014) 
points out, the use of cryptocurrencies in illegal activities is certainly an area to which effective 
enforcement of the law must be extended to. So-called white-collar crime such as tax evasion on 
capital gains also presents a significant challenge to law enforcement agencies (Ducas and Wilner 
2017).  
Whilst bitcoin’s use in transactions of illicit materials does occur, it does by no means 
characterise the sole nature of the currency itself; bitcoin is by no means completely anonymous and it 
remains possible for wallet addresses to be traced back to user identities (Greenberg 2013). Privacy-
focussed coins such as monero and dash are increasingly being used in favour of bitcoin by those 
wishing to conceal their identities online. 
It is and will continue to be difficult to keep track of and monitor all of those who hold 
cryptocurrency assets and ensure that, for example, they have paid any taxes they owe without 
working closely and effectively with other parties. This is why, in order to be effective, legal coding 
would ideally come from constructive and mutual cooperation between authorities and businesses 
offering cryptocurrency related services. This is, to a degree, already happening. As mentioned, 
extension of the AMLd in the European Union is requiring all cryptocurrency exchanges to compile 
databases of user-identities, which authorities can access, should they request it. It is in the interest of 
authorities and industry alike to build effective and cooperative mutual working relationships and 
publish clear, simple regulations which are easy to implement for consumers and businesses; whilst 
cryptocurrencies operate in a space which is at the legal periphery, they will remain extremely 
difficult to control legally. 
 
                                                          
15 Silk Road gained notoriety as an eBay-style marketplace accessible only through the encrypted Tor browser, 
where a wide range of illicit substances could be purchased using bitcoin. The website was closed down in 2013 
after the arrest of its founder Ross Ulbricht (Dolliver 2015). 
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2.2.3 – Subsidiarity 
 At the same time as regulatory frameworks are being constructed, authorities walk a tightrope 
between making legal coding effective whilst also keeping it from being overbearing or heavy-handed 
(Barber, et al. 2012; Filippi 2014). Cryptocurrencies are a technology in their early infancy and so 
regulation which nudges the compass needle of development a few degrees to the left or right could 
lead to a radically different destination years later. In the presence too heavy or sweeping regulation, 
innovation may be stifled and relegated to social peripheries such as within special interest groups or 
the dark net. Not enough regulation – in a sense, what currently exists, which many refer to as, ‘the 
wild west’ of crypto (Johnson 2018) – and consumers are left vulnerable in a host of ways, including 
losing vast amounts of money in price swings, scam-ICOs and mistake transactions. 
 The shape of the regulatory environment of cryptocurrency in future will, for a large part, 
depend on where regulation comes from; it could either be state-regulated or self-regulated (this  
could come through market-based mechanisms but also institutions such as the Bitcoin Foundation 
(Filippi 2014)). With expertise on the subject in most regulatory systems still virtually non-existent, 
self-regulation from inside the industry may be the most efficient approach for these initial stages 
(Filippi 2014). At the same time, states would be wise to pursue opening channels for knowledge to 
diffuse between industry and regulators. Again here, mutual cooperation in this field will likely 
produce the most effective results. The European Union’s commencement of the Blockchain 
observatory and forum16 may serve as an example of a forum where growth of effective regulation 
can be successfully fostered through dialogue between industry and policy-makers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 See 4.0 for further explanation on this. 
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2.3 – The Practice of ICOs 
 
 Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are an innovative fundraising method for start-up firms which 
saw huge adoption in particular, during the second half of 2017. Comparable to crowdfunding, ICOs 
offer tokens to early investors at a fixed price, in exchange for traditional fiat currencies or established 
cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin or ethereum. The capital is used by the firm for project development 
and the tokens can then be exchanged by holders for products or services offered by the issuing 
business venture in future (Wöckener, et al. 2017). The whole process is similar to an initial public 
offering (IPO) on the traditional stock market, but differs in that tokens do not represent any form of 
ownership or dividend right from the venture itself; rather they represent a bet based on the start-up’s 
future success resulting in a higher return in exchange for the token17 (Wöckener, et al. 2017).  
 ICOs as a novel fundraising practice, attracted significant controversy following their 
proliferation during 2017. Their potential lies in the speed with which they can attract capital to 
projects, as they have proven to be extremely powerful tools for raising large funds in a short amount 
of time; upon launch of their ICO in May 2017, privacy-focussed internet browser developer Brave 
raised around thirty-five million dollars from investors in under one minute (Roberts 2017). However, 
with ICOs occupying part of the same legal grey area in which cryptocurrencies find themselves, 
regulatory protection for investors is lacking from most legal coding. IPOs first have to be approved 
by the relevant state’s financial conduct authority before shares may go on sale. ICOs on the other 
hand go through no such audit, which has led to an ICO marketplace with a high volume of low-
quality products and low investor protection (Roberts 2017). Numerous scam ICOs have been 
identified since mid-2017. Vietnamese start-up Modern Tech raised $660 million in April 2018 
through their Pincoin token, before disappearing without trace (Biggs 2018). These so-called ‘exit 
scams’ often use the façade of a slick white paper and website to lure investors into putting money 
                                                          
17 As Wöckener, et al. (2017) point out, this leads to a secondary token market as these assets are fungible in the 
same way as cryptocurrencies. 
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down. This, in combination with minimum investment thresholds allows them to acquire huge 
amounts of cash in extremely short time spans, making exits extremely lucrative. 
 The challenges regarding ICOs therefore revolve around making the practice safer for 
investors and addressing the problem of ‘exit scams’. Regulatory framework targeting ICOs is already 
creeping in in many jurisdictions including China, South Korea and the US, modelling in most cases 
IPO regulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US has generally stuck to its 
principle of categorising tokens as securities and thereby extending its established framework for 
securities to many digital tokens as well18. Nevertheless, ‘exit scams’ remain a problem. As 
cryptocurrency is in many ways a ‘borderless space’ with firms operating irrespective of geographical 
location and offering products to clients all over the world, national jurisdictions can only reach so 
far. If scam ICOs are to be seriously addressed, it may take multilateral cooperation between 
governments to create an international framework through which governments can work together to 
seal any cracks in legal coding which scammers can exploit. 
 
2.4 - Use-case Potential: why is this significant for Europe? 
 
When considering cryptocurrency’s use-case potential for Europe, the greater application 
value of blockchain technology as a whole must be considered. Blockchain’s promise – which has 
been referred to as, ‘transformative’ (Finck, Blockchain Regulation 2016), ‘opening a new chapter in 
the history of trade finance’ (Gordon, Hood and Materne-Smith 2017), and ‘the most consequential 
development in information technology since the internet’ (Werbach 2018) – is evidently immense 
and arguably much greater than cryptocurrency itself; a little irony as the technology was created as a 
protocol primarily for bitcoin to run on. Nevertheless, cryptocurrencies remain an integral part of 
blockchain development, creating an opportunity for capital to flow into projects which can be used to 
                                                          
18 This creates an arguable dissonance, as in June the SEC declared bitcoin and ethereum did not meet the 
criteria of securities. However, it is noted that in the speech announcing this, William Hinman, director of 
corporate finance, stated that despite the manner in which Ethereum was launched (i.e. the ICO) it is now 
sufficiently decentralised that it cannot be classified as a security (Hinman 2018). 
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progress the technology further. Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a novel way of crowd funding for 
start-up projects, and cryptocurrencies and tokens are the assets which allow investment to flow into 
and around the eco-system. On this point, it is important to highlight that, again, unlike traditional 
currencies, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies’ use-case potential extends beyond it just being a 
commodity or store of value. Bitcoin, ethereum and others are an entire protocol; languages which 
computers can use to communicate with each other and onto which, in addition to currency, 
applications and smart contracts19 can be built (Liljeqvist 2018). The immutability20 of the blockchain 
and therefore of cryptocurrencies, is doubtless one of their most profound and significant attributes. 
Money, whose entire history can be traced as part of an up to date, ‘provably accurate record’, has 
undeniably enormous implications for the way trust is understood when transacting (Werbach 2018). 
For Europe, this borderless system can potentially further break down remaining barriers to trade and 
remove redundant middlemen who decrease economic efficiency in transactions. However, if not 
managed properly, cryptocurrency could present a threat to the established monetary system through 
capital drain. The deflationary nature of many cryptocurrencies incentivises not spending and 
therefore run the risk of leading to a stagnant network. 
  
3.0 – Current European Union Responses to Cryptocurrencies 
 
 The cryptocurrency space’s market capitalisation in the final quarter of 2017 was larger than 
the GDP of Argentina (Coindesk 2018). With cryptocurrencies and ICOs increasingly becoming 
destinations for capital, they have also become the increased focus of discussion for regulation both at 
                                                          
19 Smart contracts are, ‘decentralized agreements built in computer code and stored on a blockchain’ (Sklaroff 
2017). These can be thought of as programable transactions which will only be executed once certain terms are 
fulfilled, hoping to address inefficiencies in the system of traditional written contracts. 
20 The idea is that once data is recorded, it cannot be changed. This again, is a commonly held refrain when 
discussing the technology which must nevertheless be treated with caution. The possibility of ‘51% attacks’ – 
the possibility that 51% of nodes become operated by a group of malicious actors, working in coordination, who 
then use the network’s consensus property to record false information onto the blockchain (Kasiyanto 2016) – 
and the case of the ‘DAO hack’ already prove that this libertarian ideal is at any rate, not with us yet (Werbach 
2018). 
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the EU level and among member state governments. Numerous and distinct national perspectives 
have emerged but to date, these have failed to combine to form a coherent EU stance on the subject. 
Aside from an amendment to the AMLd, the EU has adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to 
cryptocurrency. Despite joint calls from French and German authorities to place cryptocurrency 
regulation on the agenda for the next G20 summit, Valdis Dombrovskis, commissioner for the Euro 
and Social Dialogue, stated the Commission’s intention only to ‘continue to monitor’ the 
cryptocurrency space (Dombrovskis 2018). 
 In order to monitor more effectively, the EU launched the Blockchain observatory and forum 
in February 2018. The observatory’s role is to gather information on global trends and challenges in 
blockchain technology usage, as well as providing a forum in which various stakeholders can 
exchange and develop ideas (European Commission 2018). An EU press release announcing the 
establishment of the observatory, expresses the Commission’s desire to develop blockchain 
technology projects to help it achieve a deepening of integration in the single market and banking 
union (European Commission 2018). The project is still young, however a press release in May 2018 
announced the creation of two working groups dedicated to clarifying ‘regulatory conditions in order 
to offer more legal certainty, … and formulate potential areas for action at a European level.’ (EU 
Blockchain Observatory and Forum 2018)  Whilst this appears to be a step in the right direction, until 
the arrival of progressive and simple regulation, the Union will struggle to foster real project 
development on the supranational level. 
 
3.1 – Data Composition: National Responses to Cryptocurrency Regulation 
 
At a national level within the European continent, there are a number of countries which are 
actively pursuing cryptocurrency-friendly regulations, hoping to cast themselves as ICO and 
cryptocurrency hubs for Europe and the rest of the world. What must be noted is the sheer range of 
countries which are listed as being ‘crypto-friendly’ depending on search terms and framing of the 
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question. A simple google search reveals that there are many lists on technology blogging websites 
which contain vastly different sets of countries based on differing interpretations of what might 
constitute being ‘crypto-friendly’. Metrics include, the number of ICOs registered in a country, value 
of the ICO market in total, countries with the lowest tax rates for cryptocurrency etc. Whilst these 
countries may have their merits for being locations from which to conduct business regarding 
cryptocurrencies, they do not all provide regulatory clarity, which is the object of research for this 
thesis. 
Two data sets were considered as preliminary lists of which countries might be authors of 
progressive and positive regulation. Firstly, data provided by ICObench.com, a website which 
specialises in analytics regarding ICOs worldwide was considered. Of ICOs per million inhabitants, 
the following ‘global top five’ data was drawn. 
Country Number of ICOs per million people 
Estonia 
Singapore  
Cyprus 
Switzerland 
Slovenia 
126.8 
48.5 
32.2 
19.9 
18.8 
 
(ICObench.com 2018) 
Further to this, data collected by BlockShow Europe was considered. BlockShow Europe is 
an annual industry exposition, most recently held in Berlin in May 2018. BlockShow, which 
conducted the study, named the top 10 ‘blockchain friendly’ countries in Europe, based on an 
evaluation of three different metrics: ICO regulations, cryptocurrency as a payment service and 
taxation frameworks. The list showed the following in order of crypto-friendliness: 
 
 
24 | P a g e   A .  R a t h o d  
 
1. Switzerland 
2. Gibraltar  
3. Malta 
4. UK 
5. Denmark 
6. Germany 
7. Portugal 
8. Netherlands 
9. Finland 
10. Belarus 
(BlockShow Europe 2018) 
 
For this thesis, the objective has been to compile a list of those countries which are actively 
constructing positive regulatory frameworks designed to invite cryptocurrency-based businesses to 
that nation. In that sense, not all nations on this list adequately fit the criteria of being ‘crypto-
friendly’ as far as this thesis is concerned. For example, those which offer 0% tax rates on 
cryptocurrency earnings because the government does not recognise cryptocurrency as an asset and 
therefore falls outside of any regulatory framework, as is the case in Denmark, do not constitute 
‘crypto-friendliness’ in this sense.  
Each of the European nations listed in the two data sets was investigated further, looking at 
government websites, documents and press releases produced by governmental institutions, and news 
articles to assess if active positive regulation was actually being constructed. The following taxonomy 
was created: 
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Country Regulatory Attitude from 
Government / attitude of 
financial institutions 
Notes 
Estonia Positive The financial supervision authority of Estonia 
(Finantsinspektsioon) has issued detailed 
guidelines for ICOs and cryptocurrency taxation in 
the country21. 
Cyprus Neutral / Positive Cryptocurrency is a legal payment form in Cyprus, 
however taxation rate remains unclear and no 
government framework exists. 
Switzerland Positive The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
(FINMA) has issued detailed guidelines on ICOs 
and taxation of crypto assets in Switzerland and 
has created regulatory sandboxes for tech firms22. 
Slovenia Positive Slovenia’s prime minister has spoken openly about 
establishing the country as a blockchain hub and 
created the Blockchain Alliance CCE, an 
organisation that fosters cooperation between 
blockchain technology companies and 
government23.  
Gibraltar Positive The government of Gibraltar adopted new 
legislation as of January 2018. A government press 
release in October 2017 ahead of the release stated, 
‘The legislation has been designed to provide an 
efficient, safe and innovative regulatory framework 
                                                          
21 Details can be found on the Finantsinspektsioon website, (fi.ee). 
22 Details can be found on the FINMA website, (FINMA.ch). 
23 For more information, see https://www.blockchainalliance.si/en/. 
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for firms engaging in activities not otherwise 
subject to regulation and that use DLT for the 
transmission or storage of value belonging to 
others (DLT framework).’ (HM Government of 
Gibraltar 2018). 
Malta Positive Malta has constructed a ‘broad’ legal framework 
providing ‘transparency and certainty’ as well as 
levying a favourable tax rate of around 5% for 
businesses in this sector (Vaghela and Tan 2018). 
UK Neutral / Negative The UK has a highly developed financial sector 
and is home to many ICOs but nevertheless no 
business regulation has been issued. A number of 
retail banks refuse to allow their customers to 
purchase cryptocurrencies. 
Denmark Neutral Cryptocurrencies remain unregulated by financial 
legislation in Denmark according to the Danish 
financial supervision authority (Finanstilsynet). 
Whether a token falls under existing legislation 
remains a possibility based on case by case 
assessment24. 
Germany Neutral The German financial services authority (BaFin) 
does not regulate ICOs or cryptocurrencies. Their 
website contains a number of articles advising 
consumers of the risks associated with investment. 
Portugal Neutral The Portuguese financial services authority 
(CMVM) does not regulate ICOs or 
                                                          
24 Details can be found on the Danish FSA website, (finanstilsynet.dk). 
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cryptocurrencies. Advice to consumers on 
investment also exists on its website. 
Netherlands Neutral The Netherlands has ambitions to create a 
regulatory framework, but so far nothing has been 
issued. The Dutch financial regulatory authority 
(AFM) has issued warnings to investors that most 
activities regarding cryptocurrencies and ICOs fall 
outside financial legislation. 
Finland Neutral / Negative The Finish financial services authority 
(finanssivalvonta) has issued numerous warnings 
about the risks involved with cryptocurrencies. A 
number of Finnish banks have refused to provide 
services to customers wishing to buy 
cryptocurrencies. 
Belarus Positive Belarus has also introduced a bill which makes 
ICOs legal and cryptocurrency trades tax-free for 
the next five years (Makhovsky 2017). ‘Decree No. 
8 "On the Development of the Digital Economy"’ 
was signed by president Lukashenko in December 
2017 and has created numerous favourable 
conditions for cryptocurrency related businesses25. 
 
Based on the information uncovered, only the countries which are seen to be pursuing 
positive action have been considered ‘crypto-friendly’ in the context of this thesis. These are: 
 
                                                          
25 The full decree is available at http://president.gov.by/ru/official_documents_ru/view/dekret-8-ot-21-dekabrja-
2017-g-17716/ (Russian only). 
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• Switzerland 
• Estonia 
• Slovenia 
• Malta 
• Gibraltar 
• Belarus 
 
4.0 – Small and Peripheral States in Europe 
 
As can be seen, what initially appeared to be a group of nations of mixed size and economies, 
has been distilled into a group of arguably unexpected nations, upon closer inspection of hard 
evidence; their uncommonalities may seem to strike one first, before their commonalities. After 
further consideration however, what they do seem to share in common is smallness and peripherality 
in varying degrees. 
Geographical peripherality is most obvious, with all of these countries apart from Switzerland 
being located at the physical edges of Europe. Even Switzerland however, contained within its 
mountains is in some sense geographically ‘cut off’, isolated from the rest of Europe’s cities and hubs. 
Political peripherality is also a characteristic which all of these nations share to a degree. 
Switzerland and Belarus are outside of the EU and do not hold any significant power in terms of 
international relations or politics. Indeed, Belarus is commonly referred to as ‘the last dictatorship in 
Europe’ and arguably represents a political anachronism in the world today. Estonia, Gibraltar, Malta 
and Slovenia, whilst inside the EU, do not hold much real weight when it comes to deciding the 
Union’s policies. Estonia has eight seats in the European parliament whilst Malta and Slovenia have 
six; Gibraltar, as a dependent territory of the UK has none. 
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Economic peripherality can be understood in a number of ways. Through traditional methods 
such as measuring GDP, but also whether these countries are seen as destinations for capital or being 
economically developed. Switzerland, is perhaps the biggest outlier here. It has a long history of being 
a destination for capital and GDP per capita is amongst the highest in the world. However, whilst it 
may feature in the global top 20 countries with the highest GDP, it does not mean it is a significant 
economic player globally. Furthermore, the somewhat caricatured ‘Swiss bank account’ is an 
anachronism in contemporary times, after international pressure throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century forced the Swiss to move away from this style of banking. All of the other countries 
have modest to poorly performing economies which certainly make them peripheral players when 
compared with other European nations like the UK, France or Germany. 
Regarding smallness, none of these states has a population higher than ten million; fewer 
people than live in greater London. This arguably serves as an explanation for their peripherality; 
being removed from the large population centres of the continent, small states inevitably remain 
peripheral to larger economic centres. 
The definition of small states is contested in international relations as the word can measure a 
number of different things. The word ‘small’ in the international relations context, comes with 
significant assumptions about a state’s ability to act on the world stage. Within the literature one 
encounters arguments that these are states which cannot assure their own security through their own 
capabilities alone, which cannot survive materially without the help of comprehensive external trade 
networks and must to a degree align their actions with those of their neighbours in order to survive 
(Keohane 2012). Looking closer at the problem, Keohane draws attention to the fact that the word 
small is a comparative by highlighting, ‘small states are defined by what they are not’ (Keohane 
2012). If ‘small’ states are those who lack the power to defend themselves against any aggressor, 
presumably the US, Russia and China are the only ‘great’ powers in the world. But any binary 
distinction, for example ‘small’ and ‘great’ is clearly not nuanced enough. Keohane (2012) points out 
the arbitrariness of using the word ‘small’ to create a group which at once includes both Italy and 
Lesotho. A third category which consists of medium powers does help (Neumann and Gsthl 2012) but 
30 | P a g e   A .  R a t h o d  
 
there are still hugely comparative differences relating to geographical location and historical 
experience; a ‘small’ nation in Europe certainly carries more weight internationally than even some 
quite large states in Africa or Asia (Vital 1967). Identifying a usable definition in this context is 
therefore made easier by the fact that the sample is entirely European.  
Ingebritsen et al. (2012) make the claim that the ‘European bar’ for small states in the 20th 
Century is those states with a population size smaller than the Netherlands: around 17 million 
(Ingebritsen, Neumann and Gsthl 2012). This definition is sufficient for this paper as all of the states 
which are considered ‘crypto-friendly’ fall into this bracket. 
 So, what has led these countries to be the first movers in constructing regulatory frameworks, 
when other states initially considered may not have? Katzenstein’s Small States in World Markets 
(1985) offers some potential insights. One of the most fundamental points Katzenstein makes is that, 
for small states in Europe, ‘economic change is a fact of life’ and that these ‘states have made 
economic flexibility compatible with political stability’ (Katzenstein 1985). The thesis of his 
argument is that a degree of economic openness exists in these smaller economies of the continent 
which is not present in larger ones, because of historical experience and development in a theatre of 
larger interests. Historical subjection to the changeability of world markets has made these countries 
comparatively more open than larger ones, for whom a degree of protectionism has always been an 
option.  
This adaptability has manifested itself in a number of ways. One may first highlight the brand 
of corporatism which is present in European small states. Particularly, this refers to the notion that 
small states are run with the view of using the pursuit of economic prosperity as a means to achieve 
greater autonomy (Katzenstein 1985); the more prosperous a state is, the more political clout it 
carries. In order to achieve this, pursuit of economically liberal values is prioritised and businesses are 
given a freer rein to achieve growth. In this regard, the potential earning power of ICOs is likely to 
appeal greatly to small states. The vast amounts of money ICOs can generate potentially creates a 
large revenue stream from businesses registered in small states. Furthermore, a greater flexibility 
regarding regulation of financial practices is a common feature seen in small states in pursuit of 
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economic liberalism. Small states, in their corporatism, tend to pursue more consensual as opposed to 
confrontational regulatory policies (Jones 2008). The creation of cryptocurrency sandboxes within the 
Swiss financial regulatory structure is therefore easier to rationalise from this perspective. 
This adaptability is also evident in the nature of the political structures in small states. In 
small states, political organisation tends to be more centralised and close-knit (Katzenstein 1985). 
Small territory leads to a political bureaucracy which is much more concentrated with fewer and more 
concentrated interest groups, as well as a smoother process of bargaining between political actors 
(Katzenstein 1985). This in itself makes the process of bringing new laws into effect and changing 
existing regulation comparably easier than in larger states. This serves as a strong indication of how 
these ‘crypto-friendly’ states have been able to be the first movers in terms of constructing a 
regulatory framework; the process is much shorter for these small states than larger ones such as the 
UK and Germany where interest groups and lobby powers are much larger and more prolific leading 
to a considerably more protracted process of law-making. Belarus may, via a different route, arrive at 
the same destination here; its undemocratic regime will result in a greater concentration of power 
amongst a few individuals, also equalling a shorter law-making process. 
Furthermore, if we take to be true Katzenstein’s notion that protectionism has never been an 
option for small states, then one may assume that opposition to new cryptocurrency and ICO based 
companies must be smaller. Indeed, Katzenstein suggests that small states within Europe have 
recognised the need to let their primary industrial sectors decline throughout the second half of the 
20th century; they recognised a need to evolve into modern incarnations of themselves in the name of 
increasing efficiency in order to survive (Katzenstein 1985). A lot of small states have moved into 
areas where their natural handicaps of a small labour force or small territory are not determinants of 
success; the trend of firms in small states to ‘exploit profitable market niches’ is highlighted 
(Katzenstein 1985). The example of industrial firms in Switzerland is given which, since the 1970s 
have recognised the limitations created by the scarcity and high cost of Swiss labour, and so have 
moved into high expertise niches, such as software development and consulting (Katzenstein 1985). 
All of these points – niche exploitation, the pursuit of efficiency, low protectionism – can help to 
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underline the possible appeal of cryptocurrency-based industry to small states. Increases in efficiency 
are one of the most notable promises of the technology. Furthermore, its development as an industry 
is not bound by the traditional factors of labour force endowment, or exploitable land etc. which form 
some of the more traditional limitations to industry growth in small states.  
Naturally Katzenstein’s work – which is now celebrating its forty-third birthday – can now 
only be used to draw the broadest of inferences about how small states behave. Further contemporary 
testing of Katzenstein’s conclusions must be carried out, in order to truly validate their applicability 
for the small states of Europe today. The mass-adoption of the internet and digital medias globally 
will almost certainly challenge some of the author’s conclusions. Furthermore, the seven early 
industrialising nations of Europe of Katzenstein’s initial study – Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway – present a much more economically, politically 
and culturally homogenous group of countries than the ‘crypto-friendly’ states of Europe. Belarus for 
example, will certainly not be subject to the same economic and legal pressures as Switzerland; they 
each score a 3 (authoritarian regime) and a 10 (full democracy) respectively in the Economist’s 
democracy index of 201726.   
 
5.0 - Case Study: Estonia 
 
In order to properly test the arguments of small state theory as an explanation for the 
regulatory frameworks present in Europe’s ‘crypto-friendly’ states, a case study will be conducted. 
For this, Estonia has been selected27. Estonia is no less surprising than any other as a nation leading 
the way at the regulatory vanguard of this industry. This tiny nation of 1.3 million people on Europe’s 
                                                          
26 This is available at, ‘https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/’. 
27 The reason for its selection lies mainly in the high availability of English language literature in comparison 
with the other nations. 
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north-eastern edge does not hold any remarkable credentials for creating progressive legal coding or 
having an exceptionally well-developed financial system. 
 
5.1 – How has Estonia Implemented Cryptocurrency-Friendly Regulation? 
 
Estonia’s positive stance through regulation manifests itself in a number of ways. Firstly, in 
such a new and legally grey area, the sheer existence of any legal codification which refers directly to 
cryptocurrencies and ICOs is already a huge boon in itself; regulation explicitly stating that ICOs are 
legal, is greatly reassuring to entrepreneurs looking to invest time and capital in the industry. 
Operations taking place in regulatory uncertainty or voids creates shaky legal ground which may 
change without prior warning. Legal clarity regarding cryptocurrencies and ICOs within states acts as 
a draw because the legal status of innovative projects is less likely to change, compared with a state 
which has no legal clarity on a certain area. 
 Secondly, the reality of Estonia’s regulation is motivated by a desire to create clear and 
uncomplicated rules for tech firms. These come in the form of a streamlined business registration and 
licensing process for tech start-ups, ensuring compliance with the country’s anti-money laundering 
laws. This process is completed in under thirty days, after which time the company will be granted a 
cryptocurrency exchange license. 
Thirdly, Estonia’s laws and public-sector infrastructure, incentivise cryptocurrency business-
incorporation in Estonia. Through VAT breaks for cryptocurrency transactions as well as low 
minimum capital requirements required to register a limited liability company and apply for a 
cryptocurrency license28, the government has created a favourable situation in Estonia’s legal 
framework for young companies to establish themselves. Estonian cryptocurrency regulators are also 
known for being high quality and easily contactable, making business smoother (Witismann 2017).  
                                                          
28 Specifically, 2,500 euros of charter capital, and up to 5,500 euros for the registration process (Schwarz 2018). 
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Finally, the channels available to entrepreneurs who want to start a business are made more 
available thanks to the country’s e-residency programme. Estonia allows citizens outside the country 
to register is digital citizens, which grants them among other things, the ability to register and digitally 
administer a company in Estonia, even though they may not be located or do any business there. This 
potentially opens the door to many entrepreneurs and start-up ventures from all over the world who 
want to do business in a cryptocurrency-friendly regulatory environment. 
As can be seen here, the Estonian authorities have created a regulatory framework which is 
liberal in attitude. It aims for simple and uncomplicated codification which will make life easy for 
firms. This is in keeping with Katzenstein’s theory on small states’ and the brand of corporatism they 
tend to hold. Liberal economic practices help form part of the strategy to incentivise firms to establish 
themselves in Estonia. 
The country’s efforts to be an author of progressive regulation comes set against the backdrop 
of its established digital public infrastructure; the country is well-known for having an internationally 
strong e-state profile (Lember, Kattel and Tonurist 2018), with government digital infrastructure 
already heavily reliant on technology similar to blockchain as part of the X-road citizen database and 
bureaucracy. Its stance on cryptocurrency regulation aims to put it at the global regulatory vanguard, 
making the process of setting up an enterprise which engages in the cryptocurrency and ICO market 
easy and straightforward for young start-up firms. This highly specialised exploitation of a market 
niche is another feature typical of small states.  
The technological leap forward which has taken place in Estonia since the fall of Communism 
has been quite revolutionary; Tallinn’s cobbled streets and medieval architecture are a distinct 
antithesis to the country’s developmental direction. In 1991, at the time of independence, fewer than 
one in two people owned a telephone (Zon 2005). Just over a quarter of a century later, the country 
has become a global leader in information technology development and boasts the fastest broadband 
speeds in Europe, making its digital infrastructure ideal for cryptocurrency- and blockchain-based 
firms (Zon 2005). The country’s rapid digitisation has been a deliberate move on the part of the 
government, which used the country’s lack of technological infrastructure as an opportunity; a clean 
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slate upon which it could build using the latest technologies, rather than having to update archaic 
systems which had been installed previously. Maart Laar, Estonia’s prime minister in 1992 headed a 
government whose average age was 35 years, a telling indicator of a sufficient foundational appetite 
amongst those in power to prioritise progressive electronic technological development (The 
Economist 2013). Today, children as young as seven are taught coding in school, and internet access 
has been enshrined as a human right in the country’s legal coding (Beech 2018). 
 
5.2 - Estonia’s Technological Renaissance  
 
Estonia has had a long history of domination. It has been conquered by Swedish and German 
armies, invaded by Russia three times and ruled for over 250 years in total (Beech 2018). After the 
country became independent after the fall of the Soviet Union, it was underdeveloped and backward. 
Its journey to becoming a digital hub began with projects throughout the 1990s, designed to bring 
Estonia’s domestic infrastructure into step with Western Europe. Due to the country’s small size and 
limited resources, the government states that the most efficient and cost-saving practices were 
pursued. This led to development of a digital infrastructure in the public sector, which minimized 
bureaucracy and wastage (Heller 2017). Citizens have online profiles and through these, can vote in 
elections online, and each citizen’s records relevant to over four-thousand services, from medical 
history and financial records to information relevant for registering a new business, are stored 
electronically on a database, meaning that the relevant institution as well as the citizen has access to it 
when it is required (Scott 2014). This digitisation is part of a larger ambition by the government to 
create a ‘once only’ policy – the idea behind this being that a citizen should only ever have to input a 
piece of information once and thereafter, this information can be drawn upon when required (Heller 
2017). In reality, this translates into many documents which are online and largely ‘auto-filled’, 
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meaning that citizens must only fill in the gaps on, for example, their tax returns29. This growth of 
Estonia’s digital bureaucracy can lead one to draw parallels to Haas’ theory of neofunctionalism, 
which holds at its core the idea of ‘spillover’. This holds that integration in one area will inevitably 
lead to integration in other areas. This is evident through the ever-increasing number of public 
services which are accessed through the country’s digital infrastructure. In 2014, Estonia became one 
of the founding members of the Digital 5 (D5) group, along with the UK, Israel, New Zealand and 
South Korea. These five nations, all considered to have advanced digital state profiles, committed in a 
non-binding agreement to create a forum for sharing information in order to further strengthen the 
capacity for the digital economy and digital bureaucracy. 
The pervasiveness of the government’s use of its online database attracts many questions 
about privacy; how can data be safely stored and how is it kept safe from hackers or other malicious 
agents? The government’s online platform, known as X-road, uses cryptographic hashing functions in 
an equivalent way to blockchain to keep a record of all those parties who access citizen’s data, and 
which specific part they access. This record is available for consultation by citizens at any time, who 
can see by whom and for what reason their data was accessed. This method of record-keeping allows 
for interoperability of data, without the fear of unfettered access to data by unknown parties.  
Heller remarks that the government reports that the saving in salaries and expenditures which 
comes through the efficiency of its digitalised system amounts to as much as 2% of the country’s 
GDP per year – incidentally this is the cost of the country’s NATO membership; on this point, Heller 
remarks that former president Toomas Hendrik Ilves joked that the country essentially ‘got its 
protection for free’ (Heller 2017). This is highly significant given that relations between the EU and 
Russia are already strained and Estonia, together with Latvia and Lithuania would likely find itself on 
the frontline of any armed conflict between the two powers. Indeed, with the deterioration of relations 
between Russia and the West in recent years, the presence of NATO troops on Estonia territory has 
increased and the country’s defence spending has almost doubled since 2005 (Batchelor 2017). 
                                                          
29Estonia’s government boasts that tax returns now take around five minutes to complete since the 
implementation of this digital system (Heller 2017). 
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Estonia exemplifies a region of the world which has historically struggled with security, 
typical of Katzenstein’s description of small states. Upon gaining independence, the country’s pursuit 
of efficient administrative practices is characteristic of small states in order to maximise the potential 
of their available resources. The notion that Estonia’s digitisation might be motivated out of a desire 
to shore up its borders against Russia sounds at first a sensational example of potential reasons for its 
authoring of ‘crypto-friendly’ legislation. However, when seen through the lens of small state theory, 
the notion becomes more logical. Furthermore, that the very technology which provides the country’s 
efficiency savings should also increase informational security in itself acts as a double indicator of 
Estonia’s desire to increase its own security.  
Heller goes further to cite Estonia’s national digital advisor, Marten Kaevats, who remarked 
that the costs cut for the public sector should by no means be seen as the only benefit of Estonia’s 
digitisation; Kaevats sees the enthusiasm and openness to progressive digital technologies and 
solutions in Estonia as a huge value in itself, which has been a direct result of public policy (Heller 
2017). This is insightful and echoes the findings of Lember, Kattel and Tonurist (2018), whose study 
highlights the importance of technological integration as a contributor to shaping the direction of 
growth of a government’s administrative capacity. Essentially, technological integration into the 
public sector, they claim, has huge implications for the ways in which the public sector will develop 
and what capacities it will be responsible for (Lember, Kattel and Tonurist 2018). This is indicative of 
an organisational co-evolution between the integration of technology and the development of public 
policy (Nelson and Winter 1982). Naturally the use of technology similar to blockchain as part of the 
X-road system, the cornerstone of the government’s online administration, may lead one to draw 
reasoned estimations of the country’s position on cryptocurrency and ICO development, supporting 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) findings further.  Given the public-sector implementation of hi-tech 
solutions which has already taken place in Estonia, this gives the country’s policy-makers a greatly 
more informed view of cryptocurrency’s use cases and vulnerabilities.  
The factor of having a strong digital profile on a state level is something unique to Estonia 
amongst the group of European ‘crypto-friendly states’. None of the other seven states boast such an 
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established digital profile. None are present in the D5 group which contains only one other European 
country, the UK. As was shown in section 2 of this paper, the nature of cryptocurrencies and 
technology which surrounds them is highly technical. The fact that Estonia has a significant advantage 
in terms of potentially understanding blockchain and its uses, through its high level of digital 
bureaucracy through the government’s X-road system, naturally puts it in an advantageous position to 
transfer knowledge and create a functioning cryptocurrency infrastructure. The notion of ‘spillover’ 
(Haas 1958), can further be applied here in order to argue that it might be seen as only logical that 
Estonia might redirect its expertise to this area in order to further exploit this highly specialist ‘market 
niche’ (Katzenstein 1985). Path dependency may also be used to support the notion that it is only 
logical that citizens of Estonia, having been in a sense primed in such a way throughout their lives, 
might see cryptocurrency as an opportunity rather than regard it with scepticism. However, if this is 
the case it would logically follow that Estonia sees cryptocurrency primarily as a technological 
venture rather than an economic or financial one. However, as none of the other countries which are 
pursuing pro-cryptocurrency regulation are doing so from a point of any remarkably established 
digital infrastructure this may just be a happy coincidence for Estonia rather than a primary 
motivating factor. 
Estonia, whose population is only 1.3 million, has seen a rapid decline in its primary 
industrial sector. Foreign direct investment (FDI) since independence has prioritised service sector 
operations whilst many primary activities such as fishing have been moved away from and are no 
longer profitable (Eamets 2001). Fishing, agriculture and manufacture formed a large part of the 
Estonian economy at independence (almost 50% of total economic output), however these sectors 
have declined by more than two thirds in the last twenty years (Estonian Statistical Office 2000). The 
permitted decline of primary industry is a feature of small states, remarked upon by Katzenstein 
(1985) to make way for more high-tech specialist areas of industry which permit relinquishment of 
wage restraint. The country’s reliance on FDI since independence shows an international orientation 
and goes some way toward explaining why the notion of ICOs and cryptocurrency may appeal to 
those in power in the country. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that since joining the EU, Estonia has become an aging 
society with the youth (those under 26 years) a particularly rapidly shrinking section of society (Bart, 
et al. 2014). There are a number of reasons for this, most notably: the birth-rate is extremely low and 
has fallen consistently since 2005. Compounding this fact is that migration figures are net negative, 
with young people in particular leaving the country in search of opportunities in other EU countries, 
notably Finland, Germany and the UK (Bart, et al. 2014). Lastly, Estonia is home to a large ethnically 
Russian minority whose youth in particular are greatly at risk of marginalisation from society and 
vulnerable to poverty; 27% of these youths were unemployed in 2010 (Bart, et al. 2014). 
The aging population that the country suffers from illustrates possible motivating factors for 
active creation of cryptocurrency-friendly regulatory spaces by the government. With the decline of 
primary industry, the government should naturally attempt to fully exploit profitable niches to create 
revenue. A niche that may help solve a problem in another area (namely the aging population) is 
likely to appeal to policy-makers. Cryptocurrency, a sector generally dominated by young people, 
may lead the government to expect that investment in these areas will also persuade more young 
people to remain in Estonia, as well as attract young entrepreneurs from outside Estonia to make their 
home there.  
 
6.0 – Conclusion 
 
 This thesis set out to answer the research question, ‘Why are small European states more 
likely to perceive cryptocurrencies as an opportunity for economic growth than larger ones?’ 
It is clear from the evidence gathered that there are many contributing factors, not all of which 
could be explored in this thesis. The advent of blockchain technology seems to be regarded by many 
as a significant part the paradigm shift that is taking place as the world passes into a fully-fledged 
digital age. Nevertheless, through exploration of the concept of small states, it appears that a number 
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of characteristics which the theory traditionally holds to be true can be found as evident in the ‘crypto-
friendly’ states of Europe. 
In particular, the need for security potentially forms a significant part of the behaviour of 
Estonia, vis-à-vis, not only its approach to cryptocurrency regulation, but also its establishment of 
digital infrastructure in general since achieving independence. Estonia’s efficiency-savings through its 
digital development have equalled its NATO membership fee. The existing digital infrastructure in 
the country also clearly provides a significant and solid foundation from which to branch out into 
cryptocurrency-based business hosting. Attempting to set up the country as a cryptocurrency hub may 
be explained as a combination of two things: natural extension of already-present computing expertise 
and exploitation of a narrow but significant market niche. Both are characteristic of small states.  
Whether the results of the Estonian case study can be extrapolated to Switzerland, Slovenia, 
Malta, Gibraltar or Belarus would require further research. However, it would seem that perhaps the 
factors present in Estonia may be somewhat unique among these nations. None of the other five states 
has anything like the established digital infrastructure which Estonia has, from which to transfer 
knowledge or expertise. Estonia’s presence in the D5 group, as stated, underlines this. However, 
vulnerability and the need for security is something common to all of these states to relatively high 
degrees; a number have been in the past highlighted as areas of strategic significance from a military 
perspective and remain so to a certain extent. The Baltic membership of NATO and the EU often 
forms a source of tension for Europe-Russia relations. Gibraltar is generally a contentious subject 
between the UK and Spain. Malta was part of the British empire and of strategic significance in the 
Mediterranean; British forces only left the island in 1979. Belarus is a close ally of Russia and is of 
particular significance, forming a large buffer between the monolith and the EU. Slovenia has known 
war on its territory as part of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and Switzerland, whilst famously a 
neutral nation, is surrounded by EU states. Developing its cryptocurrency sector may work as part of a 
strategy to help it maintain its independence in future. 
But in answer to the research question, one may interpret the findings as grounds for 
argument that small states are not more likely than larger ones to perceive cryptocurrency as an 
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opportunity but rather that they just have a better foundation from which to act, explaining why these 
small states have done it first. Their open economies and their tendency to exploit niches creates 
better conditions from which to develop legal frameworks in that favour. 
These peripheral states which, as has been discussed, have their political and economic 
options to a certain degree, dictated by the actions of regional hegemons must explore more creative 
options to achieve economic growth and make their countries destinations for capital. In spite of this, 
a possible argument which seems to emerge is that states which see cryptocurrency as an opportunity, 
see it as an opportunity to develop their technological and business sectors. One gets the sense that 
those larger states who see it as a threat, see it as a threat to their established, traditional economic and 
financial sector. This is the sense given from the Bank of England speeches noted earlier. What makes 
states perceive cryptocurrency as either an economic threat, or a business opportunity, may be a 
question for further research. 
But evidently the reality of being a small state is not the only factor relevant when European 
nations choose to create a favourable environment for cryptocurrency start-ups and ICOs. Many 
small, peripheral states which are comparable have not taken this path which could be accredited to a 
number of reasons. Further research might attempt to examine a number of possibilities, including the 
relationship between the economic history of nations and their approach to cryptocurrencies and 
ICOs, or average age within a country and their approach towards cryptocurrency.  
Finally, it seems worth pointing out that the sheer speed with which this industry is 
developing means that there are very few certainties. Any research conducted runs the risk of 
becoming out dated extremely quickly. Whilst the industry is still young there are likely to be many 
sudden changes and whether the ‘crypto-friendly’ states of Europe are still the same ones a year from 
now, is far from guaranteed. 
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Appendices 
Figure 1 (Table created using tools available on CoinMarketCap.com) 
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/#charts 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Original table supplied by Quartz journal) 
https://qz.com/1169000/ripple-was-the-best-performing-cryptocurrency-of-2017-beating-bitcoin/ 
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